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41
interest and the hardships to both parties require such a remedy.
Such an ad hoc result may actually harm consumers more than help
them. Without clearly defined remedies, infringing companies may
balk at initial settlement demands from NPEs, believing that the court
will not enter a permanent injunction. At the same time, NPEs may
believe that a permanent injunction is a realistic possibility, and price
their settlement offer accordingly. This could result in more lengthy
litigation, the costs of which will undoubtedly be passed onto
consumers. Furthermore, if more cases reach the trial phase where
permanent injunctions are ordered, the result may be that consumers
experience more disruptions to products and services they use.
Moreover, if MercExchange is right and a patent regime that is less
stringent in its enforcement of patent rights actually decreases
innovation, consumers can expect fewer. new products to go along
with their increased costs.

Supreme Court Unknots Tying
Presumptions
The Supreme Court of the United States recently released its
opinion in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. ,42 which
reversed over forty years of precedent. The Court held that the mere
fact that a "tying" product is patented does not create a presumption
of market power in that product.43 The decision was lauded by
businessmen and academics, while some consumer groups lamented
that the decision may usher in a new era of consumer exploitation.
Tying refers to a process through which a company uses a
patented product to increase sales of a non-patented product. 4 The
company does this by conditioning the sale of a patented product on
the purchase of other non-patented products made by the company at
the same time or in the future.45 A basic example of tying is that of a
41
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gumball manufacturer who sells a patented gumball dispenser on the
condition that the purchaser also agrees to buy five years worth of
non-patented - and otherwise generic - gumballs from the seller.46

A plaintiff may bring suit against a business engaged in tying
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which made illegal "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
,,47
States, or with foreign nations...,4
To bring an action based on a violation of the Sherman Act, a
Plaintiff must establish that two different products existed, that a sale
or agreement to sell the tying product was conditioned on the
purchase of the tied product, market power for the tying product, and
that the tied product involved a "not-insubstantial" amount of
interstate commerce. 48 However, where the tying product is patented
or copyrighted, market power is presumed.49 In other words, the court
presumes that the patent grants such economic power to the patent
holder that the holder could then "extend its economic control to
unpatented products. 5 ° Under this presumption, patent holders have
shouldered the burden of Rlroving that their specific patent does not
create such market power.
The Court has long viewed such tying arrangements between
patented and unpatented products with suspicion, noting that "[t]ying
arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition" 52 and that "[t]he antitrust laws do not permit a
compounding of the statutorily conferred monopoly., 53 Indeed, from
the outset, the Court adopted a per se rule, holding that any tying that
conditioned the purchase of a patented product on the purchase of an
unpatented product was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.5 4 The
Court noted that such tying arrangements must be declared invalid
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because of "the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying
product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the
buyer either did not want at all,
55 or might have preferred to purchase
terms."
different
on
elsewhere
The product in dispute in the Illinois Tool Works case was a
barcode printing system manufactured by Trident, Inc., a subsidiary
of Illinois Tool Works, Inc. (ITW).56 The system consisted of a
patented ink jet printhead, a patented ink container, and unpatented
ink. Trident sells its systems to original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) who incorporate the printheads and containers into their own
printers. 58 Their printers are then sold to other companies, who then
59
use the items to print barcodes on cartons and packing materials.
Under this arrangement, the OEMs and their customers must agree to
buy their ink for the printers exclusively from Trident if they want to
use Trident's printheads and containers. Soon after, Independent
Ink began supplying ink that was chemically identical to Trident at a
cheaper price, but claimed to61 have been shut out of the market by
Trident's tying arrangements.
Initially, Trident brought suit against Independent Ink for
patent infringement, but that suit was dismissed for a lack of personal
jurisdiction. Then Independent Ink sued Trident, and alleged in an
amended complaint that Trident engaged in illegal tying and
monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act. 63 The District Court
entered summary judgment for Trident after finding that the mere
existence of a patent did not establish the market power element
64
necessary for a claim brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, noting that "the Supreme
Court has held that there is a presumption of market power in patent
55 Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 12.
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tying cases" and that it was
"obliged to follow the Supreme Court's
65
respect."
this
in
direction
But in March, 2006, a unanimous Supreme Court changed
direction. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court and held
that "in all cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must
66
prove that the defendant has market power in the tying product."
The Court said it was influenced by the large amount of academic
literature referencing empirical evidence that a patent does not
necessarily create market power.67 Similarly, Justice Stevens cited the
1995 antitrust guidelines issued by the Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission, which state that the agencies "will not
presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers
market power upon its owner. ' 68 Moreover, the Court noted that
Congress amended the Patent Code in 1988 to eliminate the
presumption of market power in the patent misuse context. 69 The
Court held that Congress clearly did not intend to for70 the mere
existence of a patent to create the necessary market power.
The immediate result of the Court's ruling is that plaintiffs
bringing a tying claim will shoulder a much heavier burden. Some
analysts lauded the Court's ruling, noting that tying actions involving
patents will now be subject to the same standards as any other tying
action. 7 1 Additionally, it is believed that the decision was necessary
and good for consumers, as the market power presumption had
become "an anachronistic tool that encouraged meritless litigation
and diminished the incentive to innovate., 72 This presumption
provided a significant amount of leverage to the plaintiff,73 while it
Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
66 Illinois Tool Works, 126 S.Ct. at 1293.
65
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68 Id. quoting U.S. Dept. of Justice and FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for
the
Licensing of Intellectual Property §2.2 (Apr. 6, 1995) available ,at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
69 Illinois Tool Works, 126. S.Ct. at 1290.
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74
hung like the "sword of Damocles" over the patent-holders' heads.
Others noted that the Court recognized the reality of modem
technology that incorporates multiple patents into a single product,
which can sometimes be interpreted as "tying. 75 Moreover, as stated
by Justice Stevens, some tying arrangements remain illegal, but "that
conclusion must be supported by proof of power
76 in the relevant
market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.,
The ruling was not without its critics. They point out that
believe that market power should be presumed in
economists
many
tying arrangements involving patented products.77 They expressed
fears that the Court may have gone too far in eliminating the
presumption altogether.7 Instead, they think that a rebuttable
presumption of market power would have been a more appropriate
conclusion - one that would have preserved competitive markets.79
The detractors note that at least thirteen states' attorney generals
asked the Court to retain a rebuttable presumption. 8 Without any
presumption, some observers fear that the door will be opened to
abusive behavior81 by patent holders, harming both consumers and
small producers.
The decision in Illinois Tool Works will undoubtedly have a
profound effect on how patent-tying disputes are litigated. No longer
will plaintiffs be able to point to a patent as proof of market power.
Yet, the Court was careful to preserve protections for consumers. The
ruling merely alters which party bears the burden of proof of market
power. If a patent does confer upon a holder the requisite market
power, the consumer will continue to be protected from tying abuses.
At the same time, the new rules should help protect patent-holders
from frivolous and expensive litigation, the cost of which is typically
passed onto consumers.
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